Social Accounting and the Public Sector by Aronsson, Thomas
Social Accounting and the Public Sector∗
Thomas Aronsson
Department of Economics, Umeå University
SE - 901 87 Umeå, Sweden
November 2004
Abstract
This paper contributes to the theory of social accounting. As such, it tries
to extend earlier literature on the welfare equivalence of the comprehensive net
national product in two main directions, both of which refer to the public sector.
One is by considering welfare measurement problems associated with redistrib-
utive policy and public good provision, when the public revenues are raised by
distortionary taxes. The other is by addressing the consequences of a ’federation-
like’ decision structure, where independent tax and expenditure decisions are made
both by the central government and by lower level governments. In particular, the
analysis shows how so called vertical ﬁscal external eﬀects, which are associated
with tax base sharing among the central and lower level governments, contribute
to social accounting.
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11 Introduction
During the last three decades, a theory of social accounting has gradually
developed. One of the basic ideas behind the study of social accounting is to
construct a comprehensive net national product (NNP) measure, which can
be used for the purpose of measuring welfare in a dynamic economy. A com-
prehensive NNP concept is meant to imply an extension of the conventional
NNP, such that the extension reﬂects all relevant aspects of consumption
and capital formation for society. The seminal contribution is Weitzman
(1976) showing that in a ﬁrst best setting with a stationary technology, the
comprehensive NNP, measured in terms of utility, provides an exact welfare
indicator in the sense of being proportional to the present value of future
utility facing the representative consumer. Based on Weitzman, the subse-
quent literature commonly deﬁnes the comprehensive NNP in utility terms
by using the current value Hamiltonian of the underlying optimal growth
problem1. More recently, the literature on social accounting has focused at-
tention on welfare measurement problems associated with imperfect market
economies2; a research area to which the present paper is closely related. A
basic insight here is that the ’Hamiltonian-based’ type of welfare measure is
not in general correct, if the resource allocation is suboptimal from society’s
point of view.
This paper contributes to the theory of social accounting by focusing
on the public sector. In all developed countries, the public sector plays a
crucial role for the allocation of resources by providing public services as
well as by redistributing income among individuals and groups. The share
of total government outlays in GDP averaged slightly above 40 per cent
for the OECD countries during 2002, indicating that public sector activities
comprise a considerable share of output. Furthermore, public revenues are
1See Section 2; the current value Hamiltonian measures the utility value of the current
consumption (broadly deﬁned) plus the utility value of the current net investments.
2This research is summarized by Aronsson et al. (2004).
2typically raised by distortionary taxes; as such, there is an additional cost
associated with public expenditures, which is relevant for social accounting.
Finally, the structure of public decision-making is, itself, likely to be of im-
portance for welfare measurement, because the strategic interaction between
diﬀerent levels of government gives rise to welfare costs.
Surprisingly, however, the theoretical literature on social accounting has
devoted very little attention to the public sector. One exception is Aronsson
and Löfgren (1999b) dealing with distributional objectives and redistributive
policy. Their results imply that, if the resource allocation is ﬁrst best, then
the current value Hamiltonian of the optimal growth problem (i.e. compre-
hensive NNP in utility terms) constitutes an exact welfare measure also in
an economy with heterogeneous consumers. In other words, consideration
for redistribution does not necessarily mean that indicators based on the
aggregate NNP concept fail to measure welfare. If, on the other hand, the
actual distribution of utility and/or consumption is not the outcome of an
optimal policy choice, then it may no longer be possible to measure wel-
fare solely by using the current value Hamiltonian, indicating that failure
to reach the distributional objectives inﬂuences the welfare interpretation
of comprehensive NNP. Another exception is Aronsson (1998) dealing with
social accounting in an economy with distortionary labor income taxation.
He uses a representative agent model where production gives rise to environ-
mental damage and derives a second best analogue to comprehensive NNP in
utility terms. The main purposes behind his paper are to relate the welfare
measurement problem to the use of distortionary taxes as well as to address
environmental aspects of social accounting in a second best framework.
This paper extends the literature on social accounting in two main direc-
tions. The ﬁrst is by considering welfare measurement problems associated
with redistributive policy and public good provision in a dynamic economy,
where the public revenues are raised by distortionary taxes. The basic ques-
tion is how the outcome of these policies aﬀects the second best analogue to
3comprehensive NNP. As such, the paper takes a broader view than Aronsson
(1998), where the main focus was on the tax system3. The other extension
is by addressing the consequences of a ’federation-like’ decision-structure,
where decisions regarding taxes and public expenditures are made both by a
central government and by lower level governments. This part of the paper
examines how so called vertical ﬁscal external eﬀects4,w h i c ha r ea s s o c i a t e d
with tax base sharing among the central and lower level governments, con-
tribute to social accounting. Although ﬁscal external eﬀects have received
much attention in other areas of economics, there are (to my knowledge)
no previous studies where the welfare measurement problem in a dynamic
economy is being connected to a federal public decision-structure.
According to the results to be discussed below, although the current value
Hamiltonian associated with the second best problem provides an exact wel-
fare measure in utility terms, it is not directly interpretable as an aggregate
NNP concept (or the utility value thereof); it also reﬂects the outcome of
redistributive policy. The results also show how the marginal cost of pub-
lic funds aﬀects the way in which public goods contribute to the welfare
measure. The introduction of a federation-like structure takes the economy
beyond the second best and implies that a Hamiltonian-based indicator does
not necessarily provide an exact welfare measure. Furthermore, the way in
which vertical ﬁscal external eﬀects inﬂuence the welfare measure depends
on the strategic interaction between the two levels of government. This will
be exempliﬁed by considering two possible resource allocations; one in which
public policy is determined in the context of a Nash game between the two
levels of government, and the other where public policy is determined by a
Stackelberg game with the central government acting leader.
3Although public consumption was part of the model used by Aronsson (1998), its
implications for social accounting in a second best economy were never formally addressed.
4See the literature on ﬁscal federalism; e.g. Hansson and Stuart (1987), Johnson
(1988), Boadway and Keen (1996), Boadway et al. (1998), Keen and Kotsogiannis (2002)
and Dahlby and Wilson (2003).
4The outline of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, I present the model
and brieﬂy consider welfare measurement in the ﬁrst best. Although the
purpose of the paper is not to measure welfare in a ﬁrst best equilibrium,
this will provide a natural reference case by which to compare the results
to be derived later. Section 3 addresses social accounting in a second best
economy with only one level of government, whereas a federation structure
is introduced in Section 4. Section 5 contains a summary and discussion of
the results.
2 The Model and the First Best Equilibrium
Since the comprehensive NNP should be designed to reﬂect all relevant as-
p e c t so fc o n s u m p t i o na n dc a p i t a lf o r m a t i o no fs o c i e t y ,i td e p e n d so nt h e
structure of preferences and technology. Without loss of generality, and
to be able to concentrate on the issues described in the previous section,
I disregard the possible inﬂuences of environmental and human capital on
the preferences and production possibilities5. In addition, following most
previous studies on social accounting, the population will be assumed to
be constant: population growth is not fundamental for the issues discussed
below. For the time being, I disregard any distinction between central and
local governments by assuming that all policy decisions are made by a central
government6.
Starting with the preferences, the instantaneous utility function facing
consumer i at time t is given by
5See Hartwick (1990) and Aronsson and Löfgren (1999a) for diﬀerent aspects of natural
and/or environmental resources in the context of social accounting. See Aronsson and
Löfgren (1996) for a study of social accounting and human capital.
6For the time being, I also abstract from local public goods (i.e. public goods that only
beneﬁt the residents of a particular local jurisdiction). I will make a distinction between




i(t)) + Φ(G(t)) (1)
for i =1 ,...,n,w h e r ec is consumption of a privately provided commodity, z
leisure and G the consumption of a public good. Leisure is, in turn, deﬁned
as a time endowment, H, less the time in market work, l. I assume that
the functions u(·) and Φ(·) are increasing in their arguments and strictly
concave. The consumers diﬀer with respect to their initial capital stocks,
k1(0),...,kn(0), which are exogenously given. The assumption that the pub-
lic good is additively separable in terms of the utility function is made for
expositional ease, although it is in line with the literature on ﬁscal federalism
referred to in the introduction.
Net output is produced by labor and capital according to a neoclassical
production function with constant returns to scale, f(L(t),K(t)),w h e r e
L =
S
i li is the aggregate labor input and K =
S
i ki the aggregate capital
stock. Net investments are determined by
˙ K(t)=f(L(t),K(t)) − C(t) − ρG(t) (2)
where C =
S
i ci,a n dρ is a ﬁxed unit cost associated with the provision
of the public good (interpretable as the marginal rate of transformation
between the public good and the private consumption good).
I begin by brieﬂy recapitulating the welfare measurement problem in the
ﬁrst best equilibrium. To simplify the analysis as much as possible, suppose
that the resource allocation is decided upon by a social planner, who is
choosing c1(t),...,cn(t), l1(t),...,ln(t) and G(t) to maximize a social welfare


















The restrictions facing the social planner are given by equation (2), the
initial condition K(0) = K0 and the terminal condition limt→∞ K(t) ≥ 0.
6The parameter θ represents the rate of time preference.
Instead of a utilitarian social welfare function, another possibility would
be to deﬁne a general instantaneous welfare function, ϕ(U1,...,Un),w h e r e
ϕ(·) is increasing in each argument and concave, and then integrate the
discounted sum of instantaneous welfare functions over the planning horizon.
This change of assumption would necessitate a slightly more burdensome
notation; it is not of major importance for the qualitative results derived
below. As a consequence, I have chosen the simpler utilitarian objective.
Let {c1,∗(t),...,cn,∗(t),l 1,∗(t),...,ln,∗(t),G ∗(t),λ∗(t)}∞
0 solve the social plan-
ner’s problem, where the superindex ”∗”i su s e dt od e n o t et h eﬁrst best
equilibrium, while λ denotes the shadow price of capital. The procedure for
measuring welfare in the ﬁrst best is well established in previous studies.
Since the resource allocation is ﬁrst best, and the optimal control problem
time autonomous (except for the nonautonomous time dependence associ-

























is the optimal value function, while the right hand side of equation (4) is
the current value Hamiltonian evaluated at the equilibrium. In terms of the
model set out here, equation (4) is analogous to the welfare measure derived
by Weitzman (1976). It means that the current value Hamiltonian of the
underlying optimal growth problem is proportional to the present value of
future utility. The current value Hamiltonian is, in turn, interpretable as
a measure of comprehensive NNP in utility terms; it measures the current
’utility consumption’ - deﬁned as the instantaneous social welfare associated
with the current consumption of c, z and G - plus the utility value of the
7current net investments.
The real comprehensive NNP is embedded in equation (4). To illustrate,
I follow the convention in the literature on social accounting and linearize
the current value Hamiltonian with respect to ci, zi and G (for i =1 ,...,n)
at the equilibrium. Since the linearized current value Hamiltonian does not,
itself, constitute an exact welfare measure (except in the special case where
the instantaneous utility function is linear homogenous), one would also need











where subindices denote partial derivatives. Then, by recognizing that the
equilibrium obeys uc(ci,zi)−λ =0 , −uz(ci,zi)+λw =0and nΦG−λρ =0 ,












i zi and J =
S
i ji. The terms within the square bracket
constitute, together, the real comprehensive NNP. For the simple economy
set out here, the consumption concept of comprehensive NNP consists of
three parts; private consumption, leisure and public consumption, whereas
the only capital concept involved refers to physical capital. Equation (5)
is interpretable such that welfare in real terms at time t, V ∗(t)/λ∗(t),i s
proportional to the sum of real comprehensive NNP and the real consumer
surplus7, i.e. this sum constitutes an annuity equivalent of welfare.
7For a thorough analysis of the role of consumer surplus in the context of social
accounting, see Li and Löfgren (2002). Their contribution is to relate the sum of the
real comprehensive NNP and the real consumer surplus to a real welfare measure deﬁned
as the present value of future consumption in an economy with multiple consumption
goods and capital goods. As such, they develop practical procedures for calculating the
consumer surplus as well as connect social accounting to price index theory. See also
Weitzman (2001, 2003).
8Turning to the implications of redistribution and public consumption
in the context of real comprehensive NNP, two things are worth noticing.
First, although the government has objectives for the distribution of pri-
vate consumption and leisure among agents, the real comprehensive NNP
implicit in equation (5) seems to contain no information about the outcome
of redistributive policy. The reason is that the ﬁrst best equilibrium fully
implements the distributional objectives. With the social objective func-
tion described above, this means that the marginal utility of consumption is
equalized among individuals. Therefore, since the optimal redistribution is
already implicit in the aggregate consumption of private goods and leisure,
there is no need to add any additional component to equation (5) in order
to capture the outcome of redistributive policy8. Second, the public good
should be valued by its production cost in the context of real comprehensive
NNP. This means that the marginal contribution of the public good to real
comprehensive NNP is given by the marginal rate of transformation between
the public good and the private consumption good.
3 A Second Best Economy
Note that the basic accounting rules for the public sector discussed in the
previous section tend to coincide with procedures applied in practice; we
do not, in general, add information to NNP in order to address redistribu-
8This conclusion does not depend on the use of a utilitarian social welfare function.
With reference to the above discussion about the social objective function, replacing the
instantaneous utilitarian objective with the general instantaneous social welfare function,




∂ci − λ =0for i =1 ,...,n
implying that λ still reﬂects the social (although not the private) marginal utility of
consumption. Therefore, given the appropriate reinterpretation of λ, this more general
model also implies equations (4) and (5); see Aronsson and Löfgren (1999b).
9tion, and we normally value public services by their production costs. An
interesting question is whether these accounting procedures carry over to
a second best framework, where the government redistributes and ﬁnances
public consumption by using distortionary taxes on labor income and capi-
tal income. This question has clear practical relevance, since such taxes are
commonly used to raise revenues.
3.1 The Private Sector
Each consumer chooses private consumption and hours of work at each point







subject to an asset accumulation equation. The consumer holds two assets;
physical capital, k, and government bonds, b. Since there is no uncertainty,
t h e s et w oa s s e t sh a v et h es a m er a t eo fr e t u r n .D e ﬁne ai = ki+bi.T h ea s s e t






with ki(0) = ki
0 and bi(0) = bi
0,w h e r e¯ w = w(1 − τ) is the net wage rate,
¯ r = r(1 − π) the net interest rate, τ the labor income tax rate and π the
capital income tax rate. I also require that each consumer obeys a so called
No Ponzi Game (NPG) condition, which ensures that the present value of
the asset at the terminal point is nonnegative.
The private agents treat the policy instruments of the government as
exogenous. The ﬁrst order conditions for the private control variables,
uc(ci,zi) − φi =0and −uz(ci,zi)+φi ¯ w =0 , can be used to derive
9One may also incorporate other policy instruments, such as income dependent trans-
fers, into the analysis. As long as the government is not able to carry out perfect redistri-








where φi is the marginal utility of wealth in current value terms facing




i(t)[θ − ¯ r(t)] (9)
I assume that the production sector is characterized by identical com-
petitive ﬁrms, and the technology is given by the constant returns to scale
production function presented above. Given these assumptions, the number
of ﬁrms is not important for the analysis to be carried out below and will be
normalized to one for notational convenience. The ﬁrm obeys the standard
conditions fL(L,K) − w =0and fK(L,K) − r =0for all t.
3.2 The Government
In the second best problem, the government will be assumed to act as Stack-
elberg leader, whereas the private sector acts as follower. This means that
the necessary conditions characterizing the private sector appear as restric-
tions facing the government. By substituting equations (7) and (8) into the
instantaneous utility function, the instantaneous indirect utility function of
individual i is denoted by (neglecting the time indicator)
v
i = v(¯ w,φ
i)+Φ(G)=u(c(¯ w,φ
i),H− l(¯ w,φ
i)) + Φ(G) (10)
Note that the instantaneous indirect utility function is deﬁned conditional
on φi, implying that equation (9), deﬁned for i =1 ,...,n,m u s tb ep a r to f
the set of restrictions facing the government. The other state variables (in
addition to φ1, ..., φn) are the capital stock, K, and the stock of government
bonds, B. The diﬀerential equations for the state variables will be described
below.
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i(t)[θ − ¯ r(t)] for i =1 ,...n (13)
˙ B(t)=¯ r(t)B(t)+ρG(t)+¯ w(t)L(t)+¯ r(t)K(t) − f(L(t),K(t)) (14)
¯ r(t) ≥ 0 (15)
where L =
S
i li, C =
S
i ci, K =
S
iki and B =
S
i bi. In addition to the
equations of motion for the state variables, I impose the initial conditions
K(0) = K0 and B(0) = B0, the terminal condition limt→∞ K(t) ≥ 0 as well
as an NPG condition on B(t). The constraint (15) is a minimum restriction12
10This is basically the optimal tax problem analyzed by Chamely (1986), which is here
modiﬁed by allowing the consumers to diﬀer with respect to their initial wealth.
11Using ˙ B = rB + ρG − τwL − πr[K + B] together with ¯ w = w(1 − τ), ¯ r = r(1 − π)
and f(L,K) − wL− rK =0gives equation (14).
12A potential problem in the analysis to be carried out below is that a nonnegativity
constraint may imply that the Hamiltonian is not necessarily continuously diﬀerentiable
with respect to time. At a switch point, where the nonnegativity constraint either becomes
binding or is relaxed, the equations of motion for the shadow prices of private wealth,
˙ φ
i
(i =1 ,...,n), may jump, and the Hamiltonian is not diﬀerentiable at this jump point.
Chamley (1986) uses a speciﬁc utility function and argues that one such switch point
exists, where the capital income tax switches from 1 to 0 (at which it then remains
forever). To be able to focus on public sector aspect of social accounting without adding
too much complexity, I will disregard the potential problem of switch points in what
follows. An alternative would be to approximate the Hamiltonian by a continuously
diﬀerentiable function, implying that the discontinuities vanish.
12on the net interest rate: it is written such that the net interest rate must
be nonnegative. This restriction eﬀectively prevents the government from
taxing a ﬁxed production factor, which would be equivalent to using lump-
sum taxation. In the absence of a lower bound on the net interest rate,
and since the capital stock is ﬁxed initially, the optimal policy would be
to implement a capital income tax such that the net interest rate becomes
negative with an arbitrarily large absolute value during an inﬁnitesimal time
interval.
3.3 Welfare Measurement
To be able to concentrate on the welfare analysis, I will assume that a unique








be the paths for the government’s control variables that solve the optimiza-
tion problem, where the superindex ”0” is used to denote the second best
equilibrium. Substituting the optimal solution back into the current value
Hamiltonian of the social optimization problem, we have (neglecting the



















where ζ1,...,ζn, λ and µ are costate variables. Deﬁning the optimal value

















13Equation (18) is analogous to a result derived by Aronsson (1998), although
his study was based on a representative agent framework with labor income
taxation as the only tax instrument facing the government. By interpreting
S
i u(ci,zi)+nΦ(G)+λ ˙ K as the comprehensive NNP in utility terms (as
we did in the previous section), one can see from equation (16) that the
second best analogue to comprehensive NNP in utility terms contains two




, which is due to
the restriction on the government following from the private intertemporal
necessary condition. This sum reﬂects the social loss following because the
marginal utility of wealth diﬀers from the shadow price of physical capital in
the second best model. The other is the marginal utility value of government
bonds times the accumulation of government bonds, which arises because
the stock of government bonds is a state variable in the second best problem.
The main purpose here is to analyze how redistribution and provision
of public goods contribute to social accounting in a second best setting.
This information is hidden in equation (18). For purposes of comparison
with equation (5), it is convenient to deﬁne the current value Hamiltonian
in terms of the direct instantaneous utility function, and then linearize the
instantaneous social welfare function with respect to ci, zi and G (for i =






where ci,0 = c(¯ w0,φi,0) and zi,0 = H −l(¯ w0,φi,0). Then, deﬁne the consumer
















i ji,0. Finally, using the short notations
φ
0

















14to represent the average marginal utility of wealth13,t h ea v e r a g ep r i v a t e
consumption and the average time spent on leisure, respectively, one can
derive the following result;
Proposition 1If the resource allocation is second best, the national welfare


























where 1+β0 =1+( λ0 − φ0
a − µ0)/φ0
a, δ0







Proof: See the Appendix.
To shorten the notations, the time indicator has been dropped in the
welfare measure described in Proposition 1. As before, the sum of the lin-
earized current value Hamiltonian and the consumer surplus constitutes an
exact welfare measure. Here, one may interpret the linearized current value
Hamiltonian as a second best analogue to real comprehensive NNP multi-
plied by the average marginal utility of consumption. Therefore, denoting
the second best analogue to real comprehensive NNP by R0,t h ew e l f a r e
measure in Proposition 1 can also be written as θV 0(t)=φ0
a(t)R0(t)+J0(t).
By comparing the formula in the proposition with equation (5), it follows
that the linearized current value Hamiltonian associated with the second best
problem takes a diﬀerent form than its ﬁr s tb e s tc o u n t e r p a r t . N o t i c et h a t
the ’consumption part’, i.e. the ﬁrst row of the formula in the proposition,
does not only contain the aggregate variables C, Z and G (as it did in the
ﬁrst best framework in Section 2); the distribution of private consumption
and leisure among consumers also aﬀects the welfare measure. This is seen
13Since uc(ci,zi)−φi =0for i =1 ,...,n, ’marginal utility of consumption’ and ’marginal
utility of wealth’ will be used synonymously.
15by the appearance of the distributional characteristics14 for consumption
and leisure, δ0
c and δ0
z. The intuition is that the government is not able, in
this case, to equalize the marginal utility of consumption among consumers,
implying that it is not able to fully implement its distributional objectives.
To be able to measure how private consumption and leisure aﬀect the second
best analogue to real comprehensive NNP, therefore, it is necessary to add
information that reﬂects the extent to which private consumption and leisure
diﬀer among individuals as a consequence of diﬀerences in the marginal util-
ity of consumption (i.e. the extent to which the government fails to reach
its distributional objectives). This information is summarized by the distri-
butional characteristics15. One may also interpret (1 + δ0
c) and ¯ w0(1 + δ0
z)
as representing the ’marginal accounting prices’ for aggregate private con-
sumption and aggregate leisure, respectively, in the second best framework
analyzed here. The corresponding marginal accounting prices in the ﬁrst
best equilibrium are 1 and w, respectively; see Section 2. In general, δc and
δz can take both positive and negative values along the general equilibrium
path; however, if ucz(c,z) ≥ 0,t h e nδc < 0 and δz < 0. The latter would
imply that the second best analogue to real comprehensive NNP attaches
lower weight to aggregate private consumption and leisure than does its ﬁrst
best counterpart.
The social accounting rule for the public good also diﬀers from the rule


















15With a common utility function, the distributional characteristics are (at least in
principle) estimable by using econometric methods. An introduction to relevant methods
for analyzing consumer demand are described by e.g. Deaton (1986).





where −µ (the negative of the shadow price of government bonds) is inter-
pretable as the marginal excess burden in utility terms; so, λ − µ measures
the marginal cost of public funds in utility terms. The marginal value of G
implicit in the second best analogue to real comprehensive NNP is measured
by the production cost, ρ,t i m e s(1+β), where the latter is interpretable as
the marginal cost of public funds in terms of the average marginal utility of
consumption. One may interpret ρ(1 + β) as the marginal accounting price
for the public good in the second best framework, whereas the corresponding
marginal accounting price in the ﬁrst best equilibrium is ρ.I f(1+β) > 1,a s
one would normally expect, the marginal accounting price of a public good
is typically underestimated in traditional social accounting.
4 Social Accounting in an Economic Federation
In the previous section, the public sector was treated as one decision maker.
However, real world public sectors are commonly organized in several levels,
where each such level is able to make its own tax and expenditure decisions.
Diﬀerent levels of government may also share common tax bases. In this
section, I will consider social accounting in a stylized economic federation
with two levels of government; local governments and a central government.
A basic question is whether or not the current value Hamiltonian under-
lying the central government’s optimization problem constitutes a welfare
indicator in the same way as it did in the previous section, where a uniﬁed
government was assumed. This question has clear practical relevance, since
the current value Hamiltonian associated with the central government’s pol-
icy problem provides the basis for calculating comprehensive NNP for the
economy as a whole. Particular attention will be paid to the implications
17of tax base sharing among the two levels of government. The choice of con-
centrating on vertical ﬁscal interaction is natural, considering that earlier
literature on social accounting does not address the consequences of public
decision-making within the framework of a multi-level government.
To be able to concentrate on the implications of tax base sharing, two
simplifying assumptions are added. First, I disregard any horizontal interac-
tion among local governments (such as those associated with spillover eﬀects
of local public goods and labor mobility). This assumption does not reﬂect a
belief that horizontal external eﬀects are unimportant; only that their qual-
itative contributions to the welfare measures are similar to those of other
external eﬀects already addressed by previous studies. Second, since the
consequences for welfare measurement of allowing the consumers to diﬀer
with respect to their capital endowments were thoroughly addressed in the
previous section, I simplify by assuming that all consumers are equal and
normalize the number of residents in each locality to one. The latter is not
important for the qualitative results to be derived regarding vertical ﬁscal
interaction.
The local governments as well as the central government are assumed to
supply public goods, which are consumed by the residents in their respective
jurisdictions, and both levels of governments are assumed to be able to
run budget deﬁcits16. However, whereas the central government uses taxes
on both labor income and capital income (as in the previous section), I
restrict the set of tax instruments of the local governments to include only
the labor income tax rate17. This assumption means that the marginal cost
16There is a variety of empirical studies on the intertemporal behavior of local govern-
ments, where one of the major issues has been to test whether local governments behave
in a way that is consistent with intertemporal optimization. The results are mixed; see
e.g. Holtz-Eakin et al. (1994), Dahlberg and Lindström (1998) and Tovmo (2004). To
make the analysis as general as possible, I have chosen to allow the local governments to
run budget deﬁcits. The balanced budget situation appears as a special case of the model
and will be discussed.
17Several earlier studies on ﬁscal federalism concentrate on labor income taxation, and
18of public funds is likely to diﬀer between the two levels of government, which
is arguably realistic. It has no other important implications for the results.
The notations are the same as in the previous section (except that the
superindex ”i” is dropped for obvious reasons). To be able to distinguish
between the public goods provided by diﬀerent levels of government, the
instantaneous utility function facing the consumers will be rewritten as
U = u(c,z)+Ψ(g,G)
where g is a local public good provided by the local government. The func-
tion Ψ(·) is increasing in each argument and strictly concave. The consumers
treat the policy instruments of the central and local governments as exoge-
nous. In each locality, the consumer chooses his/her consumption of the




˙ φ(t)=φ(t)[θ − ¯ r(t)] (21)
˙ a(t)=¯ r(t)a(t)+¯ w(t)l(t) − c(t) (22)
T h ep r i v a t ea s s e ti sh e r ed e ﬁned as a = k + bl + bc,w h e r ebl and bc are
interpretable in terms of local government debt and central government debt,
respectively, at the individual level. In addition, ¯ w = w(1 − τl − τc),w h e r e
τl is the local labor income tax rate and τc the labor income tax rate of the
central government, whereas ¯ r = r(1 − π) as in the previous section.
assume that the labor income tax base is shared between the central and lower level
governments. In practice, local and regional tax instruments seem to vary considerably
across countries, although the sets of tax instruments facing local and regional govern-
ments are typically more limited than that facing a central government. Here, it is not
of main importance to describe the local set of tax instruments in the most realistic way;
only that at least one of the tax bases is shared between the two levels of government.
19Turning, ﬁnally, to the production side of the economy, the output in each
locality is produced by identical competitive ﬁrms, the number of which is
normalized to one. The production technology is represented by the pro-
duction function f(l,k), which has the same properties as in the previous
section. To avoid complications, which are not essential for the qualitative
results, I disregard trade among localities.
4.1 The Local Governments
The levels of the local and national policy variables are assumed to be de-
cided upon before the private agents make their decisions. Each government
recognizes, and incorporate into its decision problem, how the private sector
responds to the policy variables facing this particular government. I also
assume that each local government acts as a Nash competitor towards the
other local governments as well as towards the central government.
There are n local governments (as well as residents of the federation
as a whole), which are identical by assumption. Each local government
chooses the local labor income tax rate, τl, and the local public good18, g,




[v(¯ w(t),φ(t)) + Ψ(g(t),G(t))]e
−θtdt (23)
subject to




˙ φ(t)=φ(t)[θ − ¯ r(t)] (25)
˙ bl(t)=r(t)bl(t)+ρlg(t) − τl(t)w(t)l(t) (26)
18Note that g is also interpretable as a publicly provided private good.
20as well as subject to equations (19) and (20). The factor prices are given by
w = fl(l,k) and r = fk(l,k), while the constants ρl and ρc are interpretable
as the marginal rate of transformation between public and private goods
facing the local government and the central government, respectively. In
addition, the local government obeys the same type of initial, terminal and
NPG conditions as those described in the previous section. Note that the
budget constraint contains no intergovernmental grants. Provided that the
central government is unable to implement the second best resource alloca-
tion19, which I will assume throughout this section, this simpliﬁcation does
not aﬀect the qualitative results do be derived below.
The current value Hamiltonian underlying the local government’s deci-
sion problem is written (neglecting the time indicator for notational conve-
nience)
Hl = v(¯ w,φ)+Ψ(g,G)+ζl ˙ φ + λl˙ k + µl˙ bl (27)
where the subindex ”l” indicates ’local government’. Each local government
treats the paths of τc, π and G as exogenous during optimization. By using
the ﬁrst order conditions for the local control variables, τl and g,w ec a n
derive
τl = τl(k,φ,ζl,λl,µ l,τc,π) (28)
g = g(λl,µ l,G) (29)
where the dependence of τl and g on constants has been suppressed, whereas
the costate variables satisfy




19If the central government were able to implement the second best resource allocation,
then the welfare analysis carried out in the previous section still applies, meaning that
the special case of full implementation has already been dealt with.








I will return to the conditions obeyed by the local public sector below, when
a Stackelberg game between the two levels of government is being analyzed.
4.2 The Central Government as a Nash Competitor




n[v(¯ w(t),φ(t)) + Ψ(g(t),G(t))]e
−θtdt (33)
which is the sum of objectives of the local governments.
The set of constraints perceived by the central government depends on
whether or not it recognizes (and incorporates into its decision problem)
how the local public sector responds to changes in τc, π and G.C o n s i d e r
ﬁrst the situation where the central government acts as a Nash competitor20
towards the local governments. This situation means that it faces the same
types of constraints as it did in the previous section21;
˙ K(t)=f(L(t),K(t)) − C(t) − nρlg(t) − ρcG(t) (34)
˙ φ(t)=φ(t)[θ − ¯ r(t)] (35)
20A standard reference to game theory applications in the context of intertemporal
optimization problems is Basar and Olsder (1982).
21The accumulation equation for central government debt is written such as to empha-
size its dependence on τl and Bl.B yd e ﬁning B = Bl + Bc and using
˙ Bc = rBc + ρcG − τcwL− πr[K + B]
together with f(L,K) − wL− rK =0and ¯ w = w(1 − τl − τc), we obtain equation (36).
22˙ Bc(t)=¯ r(t)Bc(t) − [r(t) − ¯ r(t)]Bl(t)+ρcG(t)+¯ w(t)L(t) (36)
+¯ r(t)K(t)+τl(t)w(t)L(t) − f(L(t),K(t))
¯ r(t) ≥ 0 (37)
where C = nc, L = nl, K = nk, Bc = nbc and Bl = nbl.
Suppose that the central government plays a Nash game in open loop
form with the local governments. The open loop assumption simpliﬁes the
analysis, since it means that the whole control path will be chosen at the
outset of the game22.I t i s w e l l k n o w n t h a t d i ﬀerential games are very
diﬃcult to solve analytically, and that a solution may not exist23.H o w e v e r ,
if it does exist, it has important implications for welfare measurement. To











The current value Hamiltonian facing the central government, if evaluated
at the Nash equilibrium, can be written (neglecting the time indicator)
H
•
















22An alternative to the open loop assumption would be to formulate the Nash game in
feedback loop form. In a diﬀerent context, Aronsson et al. (2004) show that, although
N a s hg a m e si no p e nl o o pa n df e e d b a c kl o o pf o r m sd i ﬀer with respect to the set of ﬁrst
order conditions implicit in the resource allocations, the resulting welfare measures have a
similar structure. As a consequence, I use the open loop framework here, since it is more
convenient from a technical point of view than the Nash game in feedback loop form.
23Explicit solutions usually require a set of simplifying assumptions; see e.g. Lancaster
(1973) and Hoel (1978). In a more general setting, very few insights emerge (even in
terms of qualitative statements).
24This means that (i) {τ•
c (t),π•(t),G •(t)}∞
0 solve the central government’s optimization
problem conditional on τl(t)=τ•
l (t) and g(t)=g•(t) for all t, and (ii) {τ•
l (t),g•(t)}∞
0
solve the local governments’ optimization problems conditional on τc(t)=τ•
c (t), π(t)=
π•(t) and G(t)=G•(t) for all t.












together with equation (38), while assuming that the present value Hamil-
tonian, H•
c(t)e−θt, approaches zero when time goes to inﬁnity25,o n ec a n
derive the following result;
Proposition 2If the central government plays a Nash game in open loop























where ∆• = ∂H•
c/∂g = n[Ψg(g•,G •) − ρlλ•
c].
Proof: see the Appendix.
A general interpretation of the formula in Proposition 2 is that, if the
central government behaves as a Nash competitor, then the current value
Hamiltonian of the central government’s optimization problem does not, in
general, constitute an exact welfare indicator. The reason is that the local
income tax rate, τl, the aggregate of local public debt, Bl,a n dt h el o c a l
public goods, g, are exogenous to the central government. This means that
the values of changes in τl, Bl and g are not internalized by the behavior
of the central government and must, therefore, be added to the central gov-
ernment’s current value Hamiltonian in order to arrive at an exact welfare
25Michel (1982) shows that the present value Hamiltonian of a well deﬁned optimal con-
trol problem approaches zero when time goes to inﬁnity. He assumes that the only nonau-
tonomous time dependence is associated with the utility discount factor. See Seierstad
and Sydsaeter (1987, page 245) for an extension to the situation where the instantaneous
utility and/or production function may exhibit an explicit time dependence.
24measure. Note also that these additional terms are forward looking. As a
consequence, and by contrast to the second best model analyzed in Section
3, welfare at time t cannot solely be measured by using entities referring to
time t. The practical implication is, of course, that welfare measurement
becomes more diﬃcult, since the value of marginal external eﬀects cannot
be directly inferred from market data.
The second part of the ﬁrst row represents the welfare contributions of
the vertical ﬁscal external eﬀect. To provide further intuition, recall that this
external eﬀect is caused by tax base sharing. If µ•
c < 0,a sw o u l dn o r m a l l y
be expected, one can interpret
U ∞
t µcwL˙ τl exp(−θ(s − t))ds to measure the
welfare cost (gain) following as ˙ τl > 0 (< 0) increases (decreases) the debt
of the central government, ceteris paribus, by decreasing (increasing) the
available labor income tax base. Similarly, −
U ∞
t µcπr ˙ Bl exp(−θ(s − t))ds
is interpretable as the welfare gain (cost) following as ˙ Bl > 0 (< 0) implies
an external increase (decrease) of the capital income tax revenues of the
central government. It is important to emphasize that ˙ τl and ˙ Bl can take
both positive and negative values along the Nash equilibrium path, implying
that the welfare contribution of the second part of the ﬁrst row can be
either positive or negative. In the special case with balanced budgets for the
local governments, the welfare measure takes the same general form as in
Proposition 2 with the exception that ˙ Bl =0for all t. The second row of the
formula in the proposition is also interpretable in terms of an external eﬀect,
since the local public goods are exogenous to the central government. As
such, they contribute to the welfare measure because ∆ is generally nonzero.
There is an interesting special case where the accounting principles cor-
responding to the second best resource allocation also apply in the present
context;
Corollary 1: If ˙ τ•
l(t)=0 , ˙ B•
l (t)=0and ˙ g•(t)=0for all t,s o c i a lw e l -
fare is proportional to the current value Hamiltonian implicit in the central
government’s optimization problem, i.e. θV •(t)=H•
c(t).
25Notice that Corollary 1 is not based on the assumption that the ﬁscal
external eﬀects have become internalized. It means, instead, that if the local
labor income tax rate, the local public debt and the local public good do not
change over time, then the ’exogenous’ variables facing the central govern-
ment remain ﬁxed at their initial values. As such, they will not contribute to
welfare other than via the current value Hamiltonian, meaning that the for-
ward looking terms in Proposition 2 vanish from the welfare measure. This
implies that the current value Hamiltonian facing the central government is
i n t e r p r e t a b l ea saw e l f a r em e a s u r ei nt h es a m eg e n e r a lw a ya si nt h es e c o n d
best setting.
By analogy to the short notations used in Section 3, let 1+βl =1+
(λl −φ−µl)/φ and 1+βc =1+( λc −φ−µc)/φ represent the marginal cost
of public funds facing the local governments and the central government,
respectively. Another corollary to Proposition 2 immediately follows;
Corollary 2: The ’marginal accounting prices’ for G and g are given by
ρc(1 + βc) and ρl(1 + βl), respectively.
Corollary 2 is interesting because the linearized current value Hamiltonian
provides the key behind the construction of an analogue to real comprehen-
sive NNP, in which the above accounting prices apply. To explain Corollary
2 more thoroughly, let me once again linearize the current value Hamiltonian
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t [µc{wL˙ τl−πr ˙ Bl}+∆˙ g]e−θ(s−t)ds. Except that distributional
considerations are absent here (implying that the distributional character-
istics for private consumption and leisure do not appear in equation (39)),
there are two important diﬀerences between equation (39) and the corre-
26sponding exact welfare measure in Section 3. First, the marginal accounting
price of a public good in equation (39) depends on whether the public good is
provided by the central government or by the local governments as described
in Corollary 2. Second, there are uninternalized external eﬀects implicit in
equation (39) - interpreted above - which are summarized by Ω.
4.3 The Central Government as a Stackelberg Leader
The strategic interaction among the two levels of government is important
for welfare measurement. If the central government does not treat the local
public decision variables as exogenous, the principles behind welfare mea-
surement diﬀer from those derived under Nash competition. This is here
exempliﬁed by assuming that the central government acts as a Stackelberg
leader in the policy problem.
If the central government acts as a Stackelberg leader, it will recognize
how the local public decision variables respond to its own policy as well as
how the local public costate variables and the local government debt are
aﬀected. This means adding equations (26), (28), (29), (30), (31) and (32)
to the set of restrictions facing the central government. By using the same
notations as in the previous two subsections, the current value Hamiltonian
facing the central government takes the form (neglecting the time indicator
once again)
Hc = n[v(¯ w,φ)+Ψ(g,G)] + ζc˙ φ + λc ˙ K + µc ˙ Bc (40)
+ϑc˙ ζl + ςc˙ λl + ιc ˙ µl + κc ˙ Bl
where ˙ ζl, ˙ λl and ˙ µl are given by equations (30), (31) and (32), respectively,
while ϑc, ςc and ιc are the associated costate variables facing the central
government. Similarly, κc is the costate variable that the central government
attaches to Bl. The technical details of this problem are, of course, similar
to those discussed in the context of the optimization problems described











represent the equilibrium of the Stackelberg game (assuming it exists), where
τ◦
l (t) and g◦(t) for all t are derived by using the reaction functions for τl and
g, given by equations (28) and (29), respectively, when the central govern-
ment has made its optimal policy choice. Consider the following result;
Proposition 3If the central government acts as a Stackelberg leader in the
policy problem, the national welfare measure can be written θV ◦(t)=H◦
c(t).
The proof of Proposition 3 is analogous to the proof of Proposition 2 and
is, therefore, omitted. The intuition is that, since the central government
acts as a Stackelberg leader and uses the reaction functions and equations of
motion from the local decision problems, τl and g are not exogenous; instead,
they are controlled by the decision variables of the central government. As
a consequence, the central government’s optimal control problem does not
exhibit a nonautonomous time dependence in the same way as in the Nash
game. Interestingly, this does not mean that the central government is able
to reach the second best resource allocation; only that it can control all time
dependent functions (except the utility discount factor) in its optimization
problem. In addition, note that Corollary 2 applies, meaning that the pro-
cedure for calculating accounting prices for the public goods does not diﬀer
b e t w e e nt h eN a s hg a m ea n dt h eS t a c k e l b e r gg a m e .
At the same time, the current value Hamiltonian facing the Stackelberg
leader clearly diﬀers from the second best analogue to comprehensive NNP
in utility terms deﬁned in Section 3. This is so because the equations of
motion for the local costate variables and the local public debt appear in the
central government’s optimization problem. Therefore, the static equivalent
of future utility takes a more complex form here than in the second best,
since the central government, in this case, has a broader set of state variables
to consider.
285C o n c l u s i o n s
This paper concerns the public sector in the context of welfare measurement
and social accounting. It extends the analyses of previous studies in two
main directions. The ﬁrst is by considering redistribution and public goods
in the context of social accounting in a second best economy, where the
public revenues are raised by using distortionary taxes. The second is by
addressing the federation-like structure that often characterizes the public
sector, where the central government and the lower level governments make
independent tax and expenditure decisions. I would like to emphasize three
broad conclusions;
• The second best analogue to real comprehensive NNP is not in gen-
eral interpretable in terms of an index comprising only aggregate variables;
it also reﬂects the distribution of private consumption and leisure among
consumers. Furthermore, the marginal accounting price of a public good
depends on the marginal cost of public funds. As such, to be consistent
with welfare accounting in a second best framework, the current practices
for social accounting would have to be modiﬁed in several important ways.
• The exact welfare measure depends on the way in which the public
sector is organized. A federation-like structure, where part of the decisions
are made by a central government and part by lower level governments, takes
the analysis beyond the second best model. The reason is that public policy
may, in this case, give rise to ﬁscal external eﬀects. Although such external
eﬀects have been analyzed in the literature on ﬁscal federalism, they have
been neglected so far in the literature on social accounting. The analysis
carried out in the paper explains why ﬁscal external eﬀects may invalidate
Hamiltonian-based welfare measures, as well as shows how ﬁscal external
eﬀects contribute to the exact welfare measure in an economy with several
levels of government.
• The exact welfare measure depends on the strategic interaction between
the central government and the lower level governments. If the resource allo-
29cation is determined by the outcome of a Nash game between the two levels
of government, then the current value Hamiltonian implicit in the central
government’s optimization problem does not, in general, constitute an exact
welfare measure. The reason is that the local public decision variables are,
in this case, exogenous to the central government, meaning that the optimal
control problem facing the central government becomes nonautonomously
time dependent. As a consequence, the welfare contributions of the ﬁscal
external eﬀects must be added to the current value Hamiltonian in order to
arrive at an exact welfare measure. If, on the other hand, the central gov-
ernment acts as a Stackelberg leader in the policy problem, it will recognize
how the local decision variables respond to its own policy decisions. There-
fore, the nonautonomous time dependence mentioned above vanishes, and
the current value Hamiltonian facing the central government will become an
exact welfare measure.
6 Appendix
Derivation of equation (18)
To derive the welfare measure, it is convenient to form the present value
Hamiltonian. By neglecting the time indicator for notational convenience,













+ λp ˙ K + µp ˙ B







where the subindex ”p” is used to denote that the Hamiltonian and the
costate variables are measured in present value terms. By forming the
30present value Lagrangean, Lp = Hp + ν¯ r,t h eﬁrst order conditions for the



















∂φn , ˙ λp = −
∂Hp
∂K




Diﬀerentiating the present value Hamiltonian totally with respect to time




































































where ∂Hp/∂¯ r =0if the nonnegativity constraint does not bind, whereas
d¯ r/dt =0otherwise. In equation (A3), the second equality comes from
using the ﬁrst order conditions in equations (A1) and (A2), while the third
equality is due to the property that ∂Hp/∂t = −θ[
S
i v(¯ w,φi)+nΦ(G)]
in the second best equilibrium. By solving equation (A3) subject to the














where the superindex ”0” is used to denote the second best equilibrium.
Multiplying equation (A4) by eθt gives equation (18).
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1
31By using the deﬁnition of the instantaneous consumer surplus, we have (ne-

















where the ﬁrst order conditions for private optimization, uc(ci,zi) − φi =0


















Then, using equations (A5) and (A6) together with ΦG − (λ − µ)=0gives
the formula in Proposition 1.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2
The present value Hamiltonian of the central government’s optimization
problem is given by (neglecting the time indicator)
Hc,p = n[v(¯ w,φ)+Ψ(g,G)]e
−θt + ζc,p ˙ φ + λc,p ˙ K + µc,p ˙ Bc
= Hp(¯ w,¯ r,G,φ,K,B c,ζc,p,λc,p,µ c,p,t)
where ζc,p = ζce−θt and similarly for the other shadow prices. Recall that the
subindex ”c” refers to ’central government’ and the subindex ”p”t o’ p r e s e n t
value’. By analogy to the analysis carried out above, the present value
Lagrangean is given by Lc,p = Hc,p+νc¯ r. Note that the taxes decided upon by
the central government, τc and π,a ﬀect the present value Hamiltonian via ¯ w
and ¯ r.B yu s i n g¯ w = fL(nl(¯ w,φ),K)(1−τl−τc) and ¯ r = fK(nl(¯ w,φ),K)(1−
π),w es o l v ef o r¯ w in terms of τl + τc, φ and K,a n ds o l v ef o r¯ r in terms of











whereas the equations of motion for the costate variables obey
˙ ζc,p = −
∂Hc,p
∂φ
, ˙ λc,p = −
∂Hc,p
∂K




Note here that the direct eﬀect of time on the present value Hamiltonian
is associated with four variables; the utility discount factor plus the three
variables that are exogenous to the central government, τl, Bl and g.B y
























where ∆p = ∆e−θt. Solving equation (A9) subject to the transversality
condition limt→∞ Hc,p(t)=0gives the formula in the proposition.
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